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HOT AIR IN THE REDWOODS, A SEQUEL TO 
THE WIND IN THE WILLOWS 
William Twining* 
HOT AIR IN THE REDWOODS. By Kenneth Graham, Jr. Ann Arbor: 
85 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 1204 (1987). Pp. 25. $12. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1908, The Wind in the Willows by Kenneth Grahame (hereinaf-
ter Ken Sr.) was first published in London.1 It became an instant chil-
dren's classic, bringing pleasure to parents, and fame and fortune to its 
author, a Scotsman employed by the Bank of England. It lives on 
both in the original and in its adaption for the stage by A.A. Milne, 
under the title Toad of Toad Hall In 1987, Hot Air in the Redwoods 
by Kenneth W. Graham, Jr. (hereinafter Ken Jr.) was published in 
Ann Arbor, Michigan. 2 Childish rather than childlike, and based on 
some elementary confusions, it is unlikely that it will make money, 
play in Peoria, or be adapted for television. The purpose of this review 
is to examine the relationship between Wind and Hot Air, and to make 
the case for rescuing some jewels buried in what might be called "rub-
bish," "garbage," or "trash," according to one's sociolinguistic status. 
Most of Wind is taken up with the adventures and misfortunes of 
Toad of Toad Hall, a rash and conceited, but essentially good-hearted, 
property owner who has an irresistible weakness for flashy new ma-
chines such as sports cars and motorboats. Mr. Toad is punished re-
peatedly for his conceit and his addiction, and Toad Hall is seized by 
wicked, but cowardly, squatters from the Wild Wood - a rabble of 
weasels, stoats, and ferrets who are no respecters of private property. 
Eventually Toad is saved by three loyal friends - kindly Water Rat, 
sensible Mole, a rather cautious explorer who plays the role of partici-
pant-observer, and Mr. Badger. The latter is a terrifying loner who 
hates society and lives as a recluse in the Wild Wood: He proves on 
acquaintance not only to have a heart of gold, but also to be a master-
ful and ingenious military commander. This bourgeois morality tale 
• Quain Professor of Jurisprudence, University College London. - Ed. 
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dence (Book Review), 85 MICH. L. REV. 1204-34 (1987) (reviewing w. Tw!NING, THEORIES OF 
EVIDENCE: BENTHAM AND WIGMORE (1985) [hereinafter THEORIES]). 
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ends with Toad Hall recaptured, Toad rehabilitated, and the Wild 
Wood successfully tamed. 
At first sight, Hot Air is an attempt to update Wind and translate it 
to California. An arrogant, elitist English jurist, with a weakness for 
pseudo-mathematical technocratic devices (such as Bayes' Theorem, 
decision theory, and Wigmore Charts) sets out with grand imperial 
designs to impose some dangerous fallacies on naive, Anglophile, New 
Englanders. He gets his come-uppance from the poison pen (or is it an 
unfriendly word processor?) of an anarchic, irrealist, Wild-Wooder 
who is concerned to destroy rather than occupy Toad Hall and other 
elite law schools. The story ends on a note of hope: Toad's successor 
could still be rehabilitated, if only he would give up mathematics, get 
off his yellow submarine, and fly freely in the Wild Wood. 
Hot Air has some good lines, squeezes in some sex, and is mildly 
amusing. However, it is improbable that it will be accepted as the 
True Son of Wind, for it has several fatal flaws. There is a mismatch 
between its vitriolic tone and its anodyne substance, it contains a re-
markable number of errors, and it totally mixes up the characters: 
Toad is confused with Mole; and Ken Jr. turns out to be good-hearted 
Mr. Badger masquerading as the Chief Weasel while he lets off steam. 
The outcome is that a potentially good story is reduced to mischievous 
nonsense. 
II. A STORY 
Once upon a time, Mole was working away in his middling house 
in a middling province of the American Empire. The doorbell rang 
and the kindly Postman handed him a package with an imperial 
American postmark. On opening it, he found to his amazement that it 
was the draft of an article3 responding to a scurrilous attack on Mole 
that had been published some time before in an American magazine 
which had not yet found its way by sea to Mole's own institution.4 
From this loyal and gracious defense, Mole inferred that he had been 
the subject of a malicious, chauvinistic, even xenophobic, attack by a 
total stranger; that he had been accused of holding views that were 
almost the opposite of those he professed; and that he had been called 
a "leader" of a dangerous cohort of fanatics called Theorists of Evi-
dence, most of whom had made their names in that field before Mole 
had ever publicly admitted to exploring it. During the ensuing weeks 
rumours filtered through that increased his puzzlement: Mole had 
been accused of opposing the jury, of defending torture, of worship-
3. Tillers, Prejudice, Politics, and Proof, 86 MICH. L. REV. 768 (1988). 
4. Ken Jr.'s most revealing slip is to describe the University of California at Los Angeles as 
"poor." P. 1204, n.*. This will seem odd to anyone with experience oflaw schools in Thatcher-
ite England, let alone one in a Third World country. Such parochial notions of relative depriva-
tion say much about isolationist "egalitarianism." 
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ping Science, and - strangest of all - of being a mathematician. 
(Mole is innumerate and suspects that it may be libelous to call an 
English jurist a mathematicist.) Kind friends suggested that the whole 
thing must be based on an elementary confusion between trashing and 
writing trash and did not deserve a response. 
Being a sensible fellow, Mole decided to bide his time. It sounded 
like a simple case of mistaken identity; but, of course, hearsay can be 
relied on to distort. Eventually, after further delay, he managed to 
obtain a copy of Hot Air. When he read it he was surprised by a 
number of things. First, he quite enjoyed reading it. Second, Rumor 
had been correct in most particulars. Third, Hot Air (for such it was) 
purported to be a personal attack on Mole; but despite aggressively 
asserting some nasty things, most of which were quite untrue, it was 
quite kind in a back-handed sort of way. It even said nice things about 
some of Mole's stories. When one scratched the surface it seemed to 
be not so much a case of mistaken identity as a radical misunderstand-
ing of Mole's enterprise. Finally, to his surprise, Mole found that he 
shared several of Ken Jr.'s concerns and tastes, and that Hot Air raised 
some important issues. It was rather worrying to find oneself in sym-
pathy with any of such "crazy stuff" (p. 1204, n. *). However, Mole 
was comforted by the fact that Ken Jr. had kindly set up an easy tar-
get: a Psychedelic Theory of Evidence in the form of A Manifesto of 
Legal Irrea/ist Disbelief (p. 1231). 
The only thing that really upset Mole was the procedure that had 
been followed. One of the few positive commitments to nonhedonistic 
values that Ken Jr. claims is a belief in due process; but, in the context 
of academic debate, this seemingly does not extend to (1) giving notice 
to the subject of an impending attack, (2) giving an opportunity to the 
accused of even reading the charges against her, or (3) offering an op-
portunity for the accused to reply. There is a qualitative difference 
between an unfavorable review and a polemical attack. This is not 
only a matter of elementary courtesy and fairness. If the purpose of 
robust academic debate is to advance understanding, it is essential that 
the protagonists are kept informed and given a reasonable time in 
which to respond. 
Mole rather enjoyed robust polemics. Initially he was tempted to 
reply in kind, sacrificing truth and serious issues to resonant phrases 
and merry quips. However, he was reminded that it is usually not 
sensible to respond to unfavorable reviews. On further reflection he 
decided to break his silence, but to concentrate on a limited number of 
points. His justification for this course of action is that Hot Air radi-
cally distorts the general enterprise of which Theories is a part, it mis-
represents his views on a number of issues, 5 and, most important, part 
5. It would be tedious and unproductive to respond to all of Ken Jr.'s specific points. The 
following references are directly in point: 
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of Ken Jr.'s thesis, properly developed, could add a worthwhile polit-
ical dimension to current debates about evidence and proof in litiga-
tion. In the interests of brevity and clarity, this response will 
concentrate on the most challenging aspect of the critique and relegate 
comment on some detailed points to the footnotes. My considered 
judgment on Hot Air can be rendered in televiewese: "Illuminating on 
Wigmore; oversimple on Bentham; wrong on Twining. A potentially 
valuable political critique marred by suicidal isolationism." 
Ill. KEN JR.'S ENTERPRISE 
At first Mole could not make much sense of Hot Air. What was 
biting its author? And why so hot? Learning from one of Ken Jr.'s 
mistakes, 6 Mole decided to find out about his concerns from some of 
his other stories. This proved illuminating. For it transpires that Ken 
Jr. is involved in a sustained campaign to discredit a set of assump-
tions that he claims have dominated American procedural thought for 
· more than half-a-century and which form the main ideological basis of 
the Federal Rules ofEvidence.7 In a much more lucid account than is 
to be found in Hot Air, the nature of the Enemy is clearly revealed: 
(a) On "theory" (pp. 1220-23), see LEGAL THEORY AND COMMON LAW (W. Twining ed. 
1986) at chs. 4 and 13. See also notes 21-25 infra and accompanying text; 
(b) On induction and generalizations (pp. 1219-20), see T. ANDERSON & W. TWINING, 
ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE 258-69 (tentative ed., University of Miami Law School, 1987). 
The example of the coat (p. 1219), is Wigmore's, not mine. The criticism is unfair to Wig-
more, for the point of the example is to expose the potential weakness in a "chain" of infer-
ences. See THEORIES, supra note 2, at 127; 
(c) On mathematicist approaches to evidence (pp. 1224, 1231, 1233), see Twining, Debating 
Probabilities, 2 LIVERPOOL L. REv. 51 (1980); Twining, The Boston Symposium: A Com-
ment, 66 B.U. L. REv. 391 (1986) [hereinafter The Boston Symposium]; 
(d) On psychologists and evidence, see Twining, Identification and Misidentification in 
Legal Process: Redefining the Problem, in EVALUATING WITNESS EVIDENCE 255 (S. Lloyd-
Bostock & B. Clifford eds. 1983) [hereinafter EVALUATING WITNESS EVIDENCE]. That 
paper argues that psychologists have tended to accept too uncritically formalistic lawyers' 
accounts of litigation. I would concede that there is some force in the critique of one pas-
sage in Theories of Evidence about witness psychology, see THEORIES, supra note 2, at 139-
41, which may give the impression that the main potential contribution of psychologists is to 
provide techniques for improving reliability of evidence rather than assisting the under-
standing of legal processes; 
(e) On stories, holism, and the fact-value distinction, see Lawyers' Stories (forthcoming) and 
The Boston Symposium, supra, at 393, 398-99; 
(f) "The Cheshire Cat" view of the law of Evidence is discussed in a forthcoming paper, 
Twining, What Is the Law of Evidence?; 
(g) On "science" and "scienticism," see Twining, The Great Juristic Bazaar, 1978 J. SocY. 
PUB. TCHRS. L. (New Series) 185; note 16 infra. 
On the above topics our most profound differences seem to relate to (a) and (f); on both of 
these I find Ken Jr.'s views rather elusive; on the remainder he has misrepresented my views. 
6. Ken Jr. only refers to works published in the United States. Almost all of the sources 
cited in note 5 supra were published elsewhere. If Ken Jr. were to shelve his Anglophobia, at 
least as a scholar, he would find some potential allies for some of his causes among those whom 
he attacks. See note 16 infra. 
7. See 21 c. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE 
143-54 (1977) [hereinafter WRIGHT & GRAHAM]; GRAHAM, The Persistence of Progressfre 
Proceduralism (Book Review), 61 TEXAS L. REv. 929 (1983) [hereinafter Persistence]; cf. p. 
1211. 
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[W]hat the critics [of the Federal Rules] were arguing was that it was 
wrong to attempt to codify the rules of evidence on the basis of a proce-
dural philosophy that now appears to be seriously deficient. The more 
thoughtful opponents of the Rules argued that the field of evidence was 
in the midst of what one historian of science has called a "paradigm 
shift"; le., the fundamental theory of the subject is undergoing drastic 
change. 
These critics argued that the drafting of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence was dominated by a set of assumptions that we call the Progressive 
Procedural Paradigm. This ideology, which has dominated evidence 
scholarship for the past fifty years, takes its name from the political 
movement in which most of its founders were active and from which 
they took their system of values .... 
[W]hat are the basic features of the Progressive Paradigm? It begins 
with the assumption that the purpose of litigation is to vindicate the sub-
stantive law so as to make legal relationships predictable and certain. 
This goal requires that the court have a correct version of the facts to 
which to apply the law. The Progressives believed that the most efficient 
way accurately to ascertain the facts was to gather as much data as possi-
ble and subject it to the scrutiny of scientific experts. 8 The principal 
obstacle to scientific fact-finding was the jury, a collection of amateurs 
whose participation in the trial required rules designed to shield them 
from evidence they lacked the capacity to evaluate or that might suggest 
a decision on irrational grounds. . . . 
As far as the law of evidence was concerned, the Progressives favored 
converting a number of the rules of exclusion into discretionary powers 
of the trial judge. They believed that the more evidence that was admit-
ted, the better. If some rules of evidence were to be retained, these 
should be based on purely procedural goals .... 
The Progressive fetish for uniformity was a by-product of their other 
goals and values .... [M]aking the rules uniform served to emphasize 
their neutrality, their scientific basis, and their separation from the sub-
stantive law.9 
In other contexts, Ken Jr. has carried on his campaign against Pro-
gressive Proceduralism. He has argued that: It is sustained by "naive 
Anglomania"; 10 it serves the interests of corporate capitalism, 11 but its 
ideology is neither openly avowed nor critically studied; 12 and it "is a 
8. Ken Jr. tends to accuse his opponents of what he calls "the Hugh Hefner fallacy," i.e., "if 
a little bit is good, a whole lot more is better." P. 1212. See also Persistence, supra note 7, at 940. 
In respect of Bentham, this confuses Bentham's attack on formal rules of exclusion of classes of 
evidence and his prescription that evidence should be excluded if, in the circumstances of the 
case: (a) it is irrelevant, (b) it is superfluous, or (c) its production would involve preponderant 
vexation, expense, or delay. See THEORIES, supra note 2, at 68. It is not clear what filtering 
process Ken Jr. would support other than one that includes Bentham's criteria. I am indebted to 
Christopher Allen for this point. 
9. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 7, at 146-48 (footnotes omitted). 
10. Persistence, supra note 7, at 940. 
11. Id. at 946. 
12. Id. at 947. 
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useful ideology for academics because it enhances their power."13 
From these writings, Ken Jr. emerges as the leading evangelical 
critic of the phenomenon. He acknowledges that to be effective, its 
opponents "will have to provide an alternative model; so far they have 
not done so."14 Although he refers to "the critics," he only mentions 
two by name and more often than not his tone suggests that his self-
image is of a lone prophet crying in the wilderness. 
The "Progressive model" was instantly recognizable as an Ameri-
can emanation of what is characterized in Theories as "The Rationalist 
Tradition of Evidence Scholarship." This is a purported reconstruc-
tion of the basic assumptions underlying specialized Anglo-American 
Evidence scholarship and discourse for the past two centuries. 15 The 
avowed purpose of Theories was to expound and explore the content 
and nature of this received heritage of texts as a. preliminary to re-
thinking the field both critically and constructively at a later stage, an 
enterprise not totally different from Ken Jr.'s. At first sight, his sharp 
attack seemed to be based on a simple confusion between subject and 
author: What was intended as a relatively detached historical account 
of an intellectual tradition had been construed as evangelical promo-
tion of its ideas based on "the Benthamite ideology" (p. 1211). How-
ever, matters are not quite as simple as that: Hot Air advances a 
significantly different interpretation and a much more sweeping and 
radical critique of our heritage, even if it is shared. In the process it is 
in danger of throwing the baby out with the bathwater and of labeling 
as enemies some potential allies in the enterprise of revealing the na-
ture and dangers of the Progressive model. These allies include some 
contemporary theorists of evidence and even some English academ-
ics.16 Accordingly, it is necessary to describe the continuing project of 
13. Id. at 948. 
14. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 7, at 149. 
15. THEORIES, supra note 2, at ch. 1. 
16. For example, most English academic lawyers, including myself, deplore the erosion of 
the jury, at least in criminal cases. In respect of probabilities, almost all English jurists have been 
skeptical about the use of mathematics in forensic contexts. Nearly all the leading 
"mathematicists" among lawyers have been American, the most notable exceptions being 
Glanville Williams (a Welsh frequentist), see Williams, The Mathematics of Proof, 1979 CRIM. L. 
REv. 297, 340 (pts. 1 & 2) and Sir Richard Eggleston (an Australian judge who has published in 
England), see R. EGGLESTON, EVIDENCE, PROOF AND PROBABILITY (2d ed. 1983). The main 
critic of "misplaced mathematicization,'' Jonathan Cohen, has not only advanced a 
nonmathematical theory of probability, but has also stirred up multiple controversies in his at· 
tacks on the cult of the expert in diagnostic medicine, psychology, and law. See Cohen, Can 
Human Irrationality Be Experimentally Demonstrated?, 4 BEHAV. & BRAIN Sc1. 317 (1981); 
Cohen, Bayesianism versus Baconianism in the Evaluation of Medical Diagnoses, 31 BRIT. J. 
PHIL. Sci. 45 (1980); Cohen, Freedom of Proof,. 69 A.R.S.P. 1 (1983). Many, but not all, of 
Cohen's most vigorous critics have been American. See the commentary by more than thirty 
contributors from several countries in.4 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. at 331-58. For reviews and com· 
ments on Cohen's The Probable and the Provable, see Fienberg, Misunderstanding Beyond a Rea-
sonable Doubt, 66 B.U. L. REv. 651 (1986); Kaye, Do We Need a Calculus of Weight to 
Understand Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt?, 66 B.U. L. REV. 657 (1986); Kaye, The Paradox 
of the Gatecrasher and Other Stories, 1979 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 101 (1979); Lempert, The New Ev/-
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which Theories was one part; to give an alternative reading of the Ra-
tionalist Tradition and to show why most of Ken Jr.'s sketch of an 
alternative is mischievous nonsense. 
IV. MOLE,S PROJECT 
The part of Ken Jr.,s wide-ranging attack that deserves a response 
contains three main theses: First, that the Rationalist Tradition of Ev-
idence Scholarship, as I have depicted it, is based on a version of 
Benthamite ideology that could be used to legitimate the infusion of 
legal procedure with a set of repressive values in the service of a totali-
tarian and crudely instrumentalist version of "fanatic statism,, (p. 
1212); second, that I both subscribe to and am an evangelist for the 
Rationalist Tradition, so interpreted (p. 1212); and third, that the 
achievements (or aspirations) of Bentham and modem proceduralists 
(including myself) is "to convince people that there are apolitical solu-
tions to political problems" (p. 1213). 
My response to these charges is as follows. First, I agree that Hot 
Air presents one plausible interpretation of the meaning and possible 
uses of the basic ideas of the Rationalist Tradition, but it is not the 
only one. To the second charge I submit an outright rebuttal. To the 
third charge I offer a confession and avoidance: I concede that my 
presentation in Theories tended to play down (but not neglect)17 the 
political or ideological dimensions and that my treatment of Wigmore 
would have been improved by a fuller treatment of his political views. 
However, my relatively apolitical treatment was both motivated and 
justified by my scholarly objectives. These were to expound and ex-
pose the content and nature of our heritage of theories of Evidence as 
a preliminary to rethinking the field both critically and constructively 
at a later stage. The bottom line is that, while Ken Jr. and I have 
significantly different starting points, perspectives, and political atti-
tudes, we are potential allies in challenging some key aspects of our 
received tradition of Evidence discourse. I agree that there is a danger 
that some of the core ideas in the Rationalist Tradition can be used or 
abused by anti-democratic forces or naive instrumentalists, or by those 
dence Scholarship: Analyzing the Process of Proof, 66 B.U. L. REv. 439 (1986); Schum, 
Probability and the Process of Discovery, Proof, and Choice, 66 B.U. L. REv. 825, 827-76 (1986). 
More generally, obsession with "scientific analogies" has seemed, to English eyes, to be a pecu-
liarly American phenomenon. See The Great Juristic Bazaar, supra note 5, (g), at 192-93. Eng-
lish academic law has traditionally tended to have closer links with the humanities (philosophy, 
history, anthropology, literature, social theory) than with the "sciences," including "scientific" 
versions of social studies. I, for one, have shared this taste and have on occasion satirized the use 
of scientific analogues in law by American jurists who mistranslated "wissenschaft" as "science." 
This is not so much a plug for English humanism as a plea for a more discriminating identifica-
tion of potential allies and opponents across national boundaries. 
17. See, e.g., THEORIES, supra note 2, at 88-108, 214-16. I had originally planned to repeat 
the whole of Romilly's classic attack on wrongful conviction of the innocent, see id. at 96 n.57, 
but had to cut it because of pressures of space. 
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whom Ken Jr. calls "mathematico-verbal monarchs,"18 and whom I 
would call decision theorists.19 
In order to sustain this defense it is necessary to describe the gen-
eral enterprise of which Theories is only one emanation. The opportu-
nity to do so is welcome, because Ken Jr. is not alone in 
misinterpreting that enterprise's general aims and approach. About 
fifteen years ago, I took up Evidence as a sort of case study of what is 
involved in "broaden[ing] the study of law from within."20 I soon be-
came aware of the enormity of the undertaking and deliberately de-
cided to make a series of exploratory forays and to report my findings 
piecemeal as they emerged rather than attempt to develop a compre-
hensive new Theory of Evidence for the Modern Age.21 
As I am a sucker for history, one of my first lines of enquiry was 
whether anything similar had been attempted before. This led to a 
quite extensive exploration of the heritage of Anglo-American secon-
dary writings on evidence (only one small part of our legacy of eviden-
tiary texts) and to a more detailed examination of the two writers 
whose projects seemed closest to mine: Bentham and Wigmore. The 
example of the great James Bradley Thayer, who never got much fur-
ther than the historical stage of what had been planned as a compre-
hensive treatment of his subject, suggested that strict limits should be 
set to this part of my project; but the richness of the material and the 
extraordinary neglect of Bentham's Rationale and of Wigmore's brave 
effort to rethink his chosen field in a broad and systematic fashion led 
me to dally much longer than I had intended. 
Theories was originally planned as an introductory historical chap-
ter in a general theoretical study of evidence and proof in litigation. 
However, as often happens, it growed and growed and I decided to 
present it as a prolegomenon to a broader series of studies, which is 
still continuing. Even so, the rest had to be rigorously pruned at the 
insistence of the English publishers. The book was explicitly presented 
as "more expository than critical."22 As Ken Jr. correctly observes, it 
is not really a work of contextual intellectual history in the mode of 
~uentin Skinner or J.G.A. Pocock.23 There is a reason for this: It 
presents a general thesis about the contemporary significance of one 
part of our received heritage of thought about Evidence and Proof in 
litigation. 24 
18. P. 1231. Cf p. 1224. 
19. See The Boston Symposium, supra note 5, (c), at 393-94. 
20. See LEGAL THEORY AND COMMON LAW, supra note 5, (a), at ch. 4; THEORIES, supra 
note 2, at vii-x. 
21. See LEGAL THEORY AND COMMON LAW, supra note 5, (a), at 77-78. 
22. THEORIES, supra note 2, at ix. 
23. See generally Twining, Talk About Realism, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 329, 335-41 (1985). 
24. Id. at 336-37. 
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In nutshell form, the thesis is as follows: Anglo-American special-
ized writings about Evidence from Gilbert to Cross and McCormick 
have generally conformed to a remarkably homogeneous set of as-
sumptions about evidence and adjudication, which I have labeled the 
"Rationalist Tradition of Evidence Scholarship." The basic ideas can 
be restated in the form of an "ideal type" from which individual writ-
ers deviated to a greater or lesser extent. The basic tenets are set out 
in the chart on the following page. 2s 
This account of the Rationalist Tradition has both an analytical 
and an historical aspect. 26 Analytically it was an attempt to recon-
struct in the form of an "ideal type" an account of a set of basic 'as-
sumptions about the ~ims and nature of adjudication and what is 
involved in reasoning about disputed questions of fact in that context. 
The test of success of this ideal type is its clarity, coherence, and use-
fulness as a tool of analysis of Evidence discourse and doctrine. 
The historical thesis is more cautious: It advances the hypothesis 
that, by and large, the works of most of a list of named writers on 
evidence either articulated or assumed ideas that were close to the 
ideal type. The historical claim should be treated with caution for two 
main reasons. First, it is a tentative hypothesis based on selective sam-
pling of works of a few writers. Even in respect of those named indi-
viduals the hypothesis needs to be tested and refined by much more 
detailed research. For example, no systematic attempt has been made 
to test the hypothesis in respect of judicial discourse in appellate cases 
or in writings by continental European writers on Evidence.27 It 
would be surprising if there were not some significant deviants, but I 
would also be surprised if sufficient evidence were adduced to refute 
the claim that the predominant Anglo-American tradition of special-
ized discourse about evidence is remarkably homogeneous in respect of 
its basic underlying assumptions which are rooted in eighteenth-cen-
tury Enlightenment Rationalism.2s 
The emphasis on specialized discourse is crucial. For it is part of 
my wider thesis that there is a sharp contrast between writings about 
Evidence and the much more varied, often skeptical, literature(s) 
about litigation, legal processes, and procedure. Part of the argument 
25. This version is taken from Twining, Some Scepticism About Some Scepticisms - L 11 
J.L. & SOCY. 137, 140-41 (1984) [hereinafter Some Scepticism]. 
26. See id. at 315 n.85. 
27. See note 31 infra. 
28. As I understand him, Ken Jr. accepts the Rationalist Tradition as a recognizable ideal 
type, and castigates me for acting as an evangelist for its tenets. He seems to be challenging the 
historical thesis (or hypothesis), but adduces no evidence in support of that challenge. I hope 
that enough has been said to confirm that, far from selling the Rationalist Tradition, my purpose 
was to set it up as something to which to react; that the claims for the historical thesis are limited 
and tentative; and that, perhaps surprisingly, Ken Jr. and I are both interested in exploring 
alternatives to the Rationalist Tradition, though from rather different starting points and 
perspectives. 
1. A Rationalist Model of Adjudication 
A. Prescriptive 
1. The direct end 
2. of adjective law 
3. is rectitude of decision through correct application 
4. of valid substantive laws 
5. deemed to be consonant with utility (or otherwise good) 
6. and through accurate determination 
7. of the true past facts 
8. material to 
9. precisely specified allegations expressed in categories defined in 
advance by law i.e. facts in issue 
10. proved to specified standards of probability or likelihood 
11. on the basis of the careful 
12. and rational 
13. weighing of 
14. evidence 
15. which is both relevant 
16. and reliable 
17. presented (in a form designed to bring out truth and discover untruth) 
18. to supposedly competent 
19. and impartial 
20. decision-makers 
21. with adequate safeguards against corruption 
22. and mistake 
23. and adequate provision for review and appeal. 
B. Descriptive 
24. Generally speaking this objective is largely achieved 
25. in a consistent 
26. fair 
27. and predictable manner. 
Note: Prescriptive rationalism: acceptance of A as both desirable and rea-
sonably feasible. No commitment to B. 
Complacent rationalism: acceptance of A & B in re a particular sys-
tem. 
2. Rationalist Theories of Evidence and Proof: some common assumptions 
(i) Knowledge about particular past events is possible. 
(ii) Establishing the truth about particular past events in issue in a case 
(the facts in issue) is a necessary condition for achieving justice in 
adjudication; incorrect results are one form of injustice. 
(iii) The notions of evidence and proof in adjudication are concerned 
with rational methods of determining questions of fact; in this con-
text operative distinctions have to be maintained between questions 
of fact and questions of law, questions of fact and questions of value 
and questions of fact and questions of opinion. 
(iv) The establishment of the truth of alleged facts in adjudication is typ-
ically a matter of probabilities, falling short of absolute certainty. 
(v) (a) Judgments about the probabilities of allegations about particular 
past events can and should be reached by reasoning from relevant 
evidence presented to the decision-maker; 
(b) The characteristic mode of reasoning appropriate to reasoning 
about probabilities is induction. 
(vi) Judgments about probabilities have, generally speaking, to be based 
on the available stock of knowledge about the common course of 
events; this is largely a matter of common sense supplemented by 
specialised scientific or expert knowledge when it is available. 
(vii) The pursuit of truth (i.e. seeking to maximise accuracy in fact-deter-
mination) is to be given a high, but not necessarily an overriding, 
priority in relation to other values, such as the security of the state, 
the protection of family relationships or the exclusion of coercive 
methods of interrogation. 
(viii) One crucial basis for evaluating "fact-finding" institutions, rules, 
procedures and techniques is how far they are estimated to max-
imise accuracy in fact-determination-but other criteria such as 
speed, cheapness, procedural fairness, humaneness, public confi-
dence and the avoidance of vexation for participants are also to be 
taken into account. 
(xi) the primary rule of applied forensic psychology and forensic science 
is to provide guidance about the reliability of different kinds of evi-
dence and to develop methods and devices for increasing such relia-
bility. 
-Ul w 
IV 
~ .,.,. 
;:s.. 
~­§ 
N Q 
~ 
~ 
11:> 
-= ii)• 
~ 
~ 
00 
R' 
-
..,. 
N 
.., 
May 1988) Hot Air in the Redwoods 1533 
is that our heritage of specialized Evidence discourse became artifi-
cially isolated from these other bodies of literature and from broader 
movements in ideas and that the time is ripe for a rethinking. 
The second caveat about the historical thesis relates to the first 
part of the ideal type. This was based explicitly on Bentham's ideas, 
deliberately set out in a way that signalled rather clearly and provoca-
tively a whole range of possible points of departure from this model. 
One reason for constructing it in this way was to try to facilitate the 
pinpointing of differences between Bentham's powerful, but simplistic, 
theory of procedure, and existing and possible alternatives.29 A sec-
ond reason was that it is much harder to make confident assertions 
about Evidence specialists~ underlying theories of adjudication and 
procedure, because these are relatively rarely articulated in a coherent 
fashion. 30 There are clearly some tensions between Table A and the 
"ideal type" of adversarial procedures. One could expect detailed re-
search to reveal such tensions and more divergences by writers on evi-
dence from Table A than from Table B. 3 1 
One reason for the persistence of this set of ideas is that "Evi-
dence" as a subject of study, literature, and codification became artifi-
cially segregated from the study of substantive law, procedure, and 
legal process, even if this segregation could not be fully maintained in 
practice. The orthodox common law32 literature on Evidence con-
29. Table A allows for nonutilitarian views and for disagreements about the priorities be-
tween Rectitude of Decision and other values. It is, however, clearly instrumentalist and has the 
effect of anchoring debates on Benthamite territory. See text accompanying notes 41-42 infra. 
30. Cf. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 7, at 147: 
The Progressive proceduralists considered themselves pragmatists, rather than theoreticians, 
so they seldom troubled to develop their model in any systematic fashion. While the funda-
mental principles of the Progressive school are easily deduced from the works of its leading 
writers, modern critics attribute much of the weaknesses of the paradigm to this inattention 
to theory. They say the reason there has been so little successful empirical work on ques-
tions of procedure is due to a failure to develop any model of the procedural system other 
than a simple chronology of the steps in a lawsuit. In terms of evidence the failure to con-
sider basic theory means that use is still made of a set of concepts evolved a hundred years 
ago as a method of categorizing the existing caselaw although they have little relevance to 
the issues that arise in modern litigation. 
31. Several civilian proceduralists have suggested to me that the Rationalist Model fits civil-
ian discourse even better than Anglo-American. This raises some interesting questions, which 
cannot be pursued here, about the compatibility of Table A with adversarial proceedings. A good 
starting point for such an enquiry is the theoretical framework presented in Mirjan Damaska's 
superb study, M. DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY (1985). 
32. The warnings in Hot Air about the dangers of exaggerating the similarities between Eng-
land and the United States in respect of common law litigation and procedural law are salutary. 
The extent that shared concepts and assumptions have survived great divergencies in the extent, 
structure, style, and conduct oflitigation in practice, may be attributable in part to the atheoreti-
cal nature of American procedural scholarship, see note 30 supra, linked to the almost ·total 
academic neglect of adjective law in England. American scholars have almost completely over-
shadowed their English counterparts in respect of Evidence and Procedure, especially the latter. 
Atiyah and Summers suggest that "fact-finding processes in civil and criminal cases in England 
tend to be much more truth-oriented than in the United States. As a result there is less diver-
gence between the 'law in books' and 'the law in action' in England than in the United States." 
P.S. ATIYAH & R. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 161 (1987). 
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trasts sharply with the largely independent literature on "legal 
processes" which, inter alia, has tended to be generally more skeptical 
in tone and much more varied. As I argued in a long article (which is 
really a sequel to Theories but which was published shortly before it), 
these two bodies of literature seem to talk past each other, the one 
rooted in eighteenth-century Enlightenment thought, the other in late 
nineteenth-century ideas associated with Weber, Freud, Marx, Schutz, 
Mannheim, and the American "Revolt against Formalism."33 At first 
sight the more sceptical and relativist views of some leading writers on 
legal process appeared to present a series of direct challenges to many 
of the central tenets of the Rationalist Tradition. However, on closer 
examination it transpired that the Rationalists were not all quite as 
perfectionist or inflexible as one might think, and the challengers in-
cluded few, if any, genuine philosophical skeptics or relativists in any 
strong sense of those terms. Jerome Frank, for example, proved on 
inspection to be an optimistic rationalist who made a few skeptical 
noises. 34 My conclusions in the findings so far presented are that none 
of my sample of writers on legal process rejected outright the pursuit 
of Truth, Reason, and Justice as central values of adjudication; most 
would probably retain them as concepts 35 representing the "rational 
core"36 of adjudication while providing some salutary reminders: for 
example, that the particular conceptions associated with the Rational-
ist Tradition are not the only possible ones and, in the light of more 
general intellectual developments, often appear rather old-fashioned 
and simplistic; that there are many practical obstacles to achieving Ra-
tionalist aspirations in practice, even in a genuinely democratic polity; 
and that the biggest obstacle of all is political in the sense that those 
who have gained power, even by democratic means, cannot be trusted 
not to abuse it. 
I have yet to present a full-scale critique of the Rationalist Tradi-
tion, let alone to construct a coherent alternative. 37 However, I have 
arrived at a number of preliminary conclusions, the most important of 
which can be summarized as follows: 
(1) The Law of Evidence is best treated as a subordinate, but im-
portant, part of the study of Evidence and Proof in litigation; a com-
mon fallacy is to treat the Law of Evidence as coextensive with the 
subject of Evidence; 
(2) Such a study should be concerned not only with adjudicative 
33. See Some Scepticism, supra note 25. 
34. See id. at 157-61. 
35. On the distinction between "concept" and "conception," see H.L.A. HART, THE CON· 
CEPT OF LAW 155-59 (1961); J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); R. DWORKIN, TAKING 
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134-37 (1977). 
36. L. FULLER, THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER 92-98 (1981). 
37. For preliminary statements, see LEGAL THEORY AND COMMON LAW, supra note 5, (a), 
at 70-72; EVALUATING WITNESS EVIDENCE, supra note 5, (d). 
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decisions, but with the factual or informational dimensions of all im-
portant decisions in litigation viewed as a total process;38 
(3) Contested jury trials, however important they may be in cer-
tain kinds of cases and more generally as symbolising some important 
values, are so much the exception rather than the rule in actual litiga-
tion in all common law countries, including the United States, thl(lt it 
is unrealistic and misleading to treat them as paradigmatic of all adju-
dicative processes and decisions, still less of litigation seen as a total 
process; 
( 4) The ideal type of the Rationalist Tradition contains much of 
value, but suffers from a number of endemic weaknesses, for example: 
(i) the scholarly study of Evidence, and of evidence discourse 
generally, has tended to become artificially isolated from the study 
of substantive law, procedure, and legal processes and from devel-
opments in a number of relevant disciplines; 
(ii) the Rationalist Tradition has tended to be too uniform in 
that: 
(a) its basic assumptions have remained rooted in eighteenth-
century Enlightenment thought, here characterized as "optimistic 
rationalism"; 
(b) it has tended to assume that it makes sense to talk of one 
law of Evidence within a given legal system rather than of loosely 
related series of laws of Evidence that operate in very different 
kinds of processes, arenas, and types of litigation;39 
(c) many writers on evidence tend to be court-centred, over-
concemed with the contested jury trial, formalistic, and over-reli-
ant on statutes and appellate judicial opinions as the primary 
sources and materials for study and discourse about evidence (p. 
1208); 
(d) it has tended to take a narrow view of the potential contri-
butions of adjacent disciplines, such as psychology, to understand-
ing and reforming legal processes;40 
(e) it has tended to overemphasise analysis and to neglect the 
role of theories, stories, and other synthesising modes of perception 
and judgment in reconstructing past events;41 
38. Ken Jr. misses the significance of the distinction between optimistic and complacent ra-
tionalism. P. 1228. The former is normative and aspirational and often general, the latter in-
volves claims about the actual working of particular institutions. ·Ironically, most apparent 
skeptics, such as Jerome Frank, as well as critics of existing institutions, tum out on inspection to 
be optimistic rationalists. See Some Scepticism, supra note 25, at 300. Ken Jr. claims to be 
interested in "the practices of the complacent," but some of the main objects of his attack were 
optimistic rationalists who were far from complacent, indeed highly critical, about particular 
institutions and practices. 
39. See Some Scepticism, supra note 25, at 303. 
40. See EVALUATING WITNESS EVIDENCE, supra note 5, (d), at 255. 
41. See The Boston Symposium, supra note 5, (c), at 397-99. 
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(5) The strongly instrumentalist and consequentialist tendencies of 
the Rationalist Tradition have a strong, though not inevitable, bias 
towards bureaucratic efficiency and social control and against "process 
values" that are not related to outcome. In so far as recurrent debates 
between civil libertarians and proponents of law and order have been 
conducted within this framework of assumptions, the former have 
often laid themselves open to charges of defending sacred cows with 
bad arguments and entering into an unholy alliance with the legal pro-
fession in defending artificial and often pointless technicalities which 
contribute substantially to the mystification of legal processes to the 
detriment of litigants and the benefit of lawyers. Important values, 
such as the protection of suspects and accused persons from wrongful 
conviction, ill-treatment, and unfair procedures have too often been 
defended by unconvincing arguments.42 New doctrines, institutions, 
and rationales are needed to serve such values. 
On its own, this account of my project does not entirely dispose of 
Ken Jr.'s challenge. For it does ·not explain why I reject the charge 
that my own analysis is based on Benthamite ideology or why I am 
concerned to preserve some of Wigmore's ideas and to defend Ben-
tham against some of the allegations made against him. 
V. BENTHAMIC AMBIGUITY43 
Within the highly specialized field of Bentham studies it is recog-
nized that few, if any, Benthamists are Benthamites. A deep thread of 
ambivalence toward their subject runs through the writings of most 
Bentham scholars. One reason for this is that there are some funda-
mental ambiguities at the core of his thought: Both Fabian Socialists 
and Free Market economists have claimed him as an important ances-
tor; he was a genuine political radical, yet he placed a high value on 
security; his belated conversion to democracy tempered neither his au-
thoritarian and centralist tendencies nor his sensitivity to the possibili-
ties of abuse of power and his concern to combat misrule in all its 
forms; the architect of the horrendous Panopticon scheme was a life-
long opponent of all forms of cruelty; his theory of procedure tran-
scends conventional distinctions between adversarial and inquisitorial 
models of procedure; the great codifier was an unremitting utilitarian 
who opposed all rules of Evidence and procedure; he was ambitious 
and vain, yet socially diffident and notoriously reluctant to publish; he 
satirized political fallacies of Left, Right, and Center; he was sexually 
ambiguous; and he was deeply ambivalent about both the French and 
American revolutions. Given all these seeming contradictions and 
tensions, it is hardly surprising that much Bentham scholarship in-
42. See THEORIES, supra note 2, at 86, 100.08, 170-71. 
43. See generally Twining, Why Bentham?, in THE BENTHAM NEWSLETTER No. 8, 34 
(1984). 
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valves the study of the ambiguous by the ambivalent. 44 
Ken Jr. glosses over Bentham's political radicalism, his conversion 
to democracy, his genuine humanitarianism, and, above all, his subtle 
and penetrating intellect. Nowhere is that more apparent than in Ken 
Jr.'s caricature of the "canon according to Twining" (p. 1228). This 
has almost nothing to do with my views; rather it is a crude approxi-
mation of an outdated interpretation of Benthamite ideology.45 If I 
had to choose between the two, I would plump for the real Bentham 
every time. As it happens, I share the ambivalence of other Bentham 
scholars and, more often than not, I find myself treating him as a wor-
thy opponent rather than as my guru. Jeremy Bentham is the most 
substantial jurist in the English speaking world, yet I reject many of 
his conclusions: for example, I do not accept that what is wrong with 
convicting the innocent is that it creates alarm in others;46 that the 
main objection to torture is that it is liable to abuse;47 that silence 
implies guilt;48 that talk of nonlegal rights is mischievous nonsense;49 
or that no rule of evidence devised by man can enhance rectitude of 
decision. 50 On these and many other issues, I follow Hart's dictum 
that "where Bentham fails to persuade, he still forces us to think."51 I 
am a Benthamist, not a Benthamite, 52 but I recognize both the histori-
44. Ambivalence trumps ambiguity in this context. In some respects Bentham was a remark-
ably consistent thinker who took clear, often extreme, positions on many topics, including adjec-
tive law. One needs to distinguish between some ambiguities in Bentham's own thought (e.g., 
was he a consistent act-utilitarian? or his treatment of abuse of power) and ambivalent reactions 
on the part of commentators. 
45. As with other thinkers, including leading American Realists (p. 1230), one needs to dis-
tinguish between tenable interpretations of leading thinkers, such as Bentham and Llewellyn, 
simplifications, crude approximations, and other interpretations adopted by followers and others, 
and caricatures and distortions constructed by critics. As evidence to refute the charge that my 
efforts "to criticize and modernize Bentham are based on Benthamite ideology" (p. 1211), see 
Twining, Evidence and Legal Theory, 47 Moo. L. REv. 261, 261-62, 278 (1984). See also note 52 
infra. 
46. See THEORIES, supra note 2, at 95-100, 102-04. 
47. See Twining, Bentham on Torture, 24 N. IRELAND LEGAL Q. 305 (1973) (with P.E. 
Twining) [hereinafter Torture ]. 
48. See Twining, The Way of the Bajjled Medic: Prescribe First; Diagnose Later - if at Al/, 
12 J. SOCY. Pua. TCHRS. L. (New Series) 348 (1973); cf. THEORIES, supra note 2, at 170. 
49. See Twining, The Contemporary Significance of Bentham's Anarchical Fallacies, 61 
A.R.S.P. 325 (1951) [hereinafter Anarchical Fallacies]. 
50. See Why Bentham?, supra note 43; see also What Is the Law of Evidence?, supra note 5, 
(f). 
51. H.L.A. HART, EssAYS ON BENTHAM 39 (1982). 
52. In the present context this denial involves the following elements: 
(a) I am not an unqualified utilitarian. See Torture, supra note 47; Anarchical Fallacies, 
supra note 49; Why Bentham?, supra note 43; 
(b) I am not an unqualified positivist in respect of the classic distinctions between law and 
value and fact and value. See LEGAL THEORY AND COMMON LAW, supra note 5, (a), at 
chs. 4 and 13; 
(c) I accept Truth, Reason, and Justice as core concepts but I have reservations about the 
conceptions of each of these as posited by Bentham and embodied in the Rationalist Tradi-
tion. See note 35 supra; 
(d) I accept neither Bentham's antinomian thesis nor his ideal of the Natural System of 
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cal and contemporary significance of Bentham's Rationale. His ideas 
and arguments have left an indelible mark on our received tradition of 
evidence discourse. My enterprise was to expound and expose Ben-
tham's theory of evidence, not to promote it. 
That does not quite dispose of Ken Jr.'s challenge. There is, first 
of all, the question of controversy. Ken Jr. interprets the claim that 
Anglo-American Evidence scholarship has been remarkably homoge-
neous in respect of its basic assumptions as a claim that "the Rational-
ist Tradition has no foes or heretics" (p. 1231). He continues: "This 
is, at the very least, bad drama. Every neophyte playwright is told 
that drama requires Conflict, that Conflict requires Antagonist and 
Protagonist" (p. 1231). It is certainly not my view that there has been, 
or that there is, no room for disagreement about Evidence. On the 
contrary, I had noted that it had been the subject of a series of persis-
tent, often repetitive debates, illustrated by the different critics of Ben-
tham's Rationale, by law reform debates in England and elsewhere 
about Criminal Evidence, and by the recent controversies about 
probabilities and proof. 53 Most of these debates sit quite comfortably 
(apart from the puzzle about "adversarial" models54 ) within the 
framework of assumptions of the Rationalist Tradition: It is a scheme 
that accommodates sharp differences about ideology and priorities in 
respect of values - Due Process v. Social Control; Right(s) to Silence 
v. "Silence Implies Guilt"; Inductionists v. Bayesians; and so on. I 
would readily concede that such debates are more messy than that, 
and debates in England about the Law of Evidence may have tended 
to be more clearly "internal" than some of those in the United States. 
More important is the point that the ideal type of Evidence litera-
ture was constructed deliberately to contrast it with other bodies of 
Procedure, while recognizing that his ideas and arguments have left an indelible mark on 
our received tradition of evidence discourse. See What Is the Law of Evidence?, supra note 
5, (f); 
(e) On a number of key issues I do not yet have a firm position or posture and, in these 
respects (which include some central issues concerning epistemology, rationality, and "ho· 
!ism"), I present a moving target; 
(f) Finally, I am deeply distrustful of all forms of political power, I reject the primacy of 
politics, and both by upbringing and experience I am pretty pessimistic about most political 
utopias, programs, and solutions. It is significant that Ken Jr. interpreted the phrase "the 
politics of mistrust," see THEORIES, supra note 2, at 70, 108, as a sneer rather than an 
oblique reference to my near skepticism in this regard. P. 1213. If one's main points of 
reference in politics are Uganda, Sudan, Northern Ireland, and Thatcherite Britain, there is 
not much scope for optimism. This does not imply lack of commitment to some important 
values, but rather pessimism about most strategies for attaining them. 
This last admission, if such it is, provides one possible clue to Ken Jr.'s misreading of my 
enterprise. Rather than trying to promote or rescue the Rationalist Tradition, I attempted 
to expound and expose it with relative detachment. The "ideal type" that I constructed 
should be at least as susceptible to be used as an identifiable target for ideological critique as 
to be used and abused to legitimate repressive institutions and doctrines. My purpose was to 
advance understanding, but my sympathies lie with the former rather than the latter use. 
53. See, e.g., THEORIES, supra note 2, at 108. 
54. See note 31 supra and accompanying text. 
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literature. My scenario was of a series of specialized bodies of litera-
ture talking past each other. In what has so far been only a prelimi-
nary exploration, there have been not only one Protagonist (the 
Rationalist Tradition) and several Antagonists (a variety of apparently 
skeptical challenges to core concepts of this tradition), but also a sort 
of Resolution. The skeptical challengers make the Rationalist Tradi-
tion seem rather dated, but on inspection most of them turn out to be 
old-fashioned optimistic rationalists in disguise. Moral: Let us reduce 
the intellectual lag between Evidence and other discourses to a decent 
fifty years. Ken Jr.'s error was that he mistook Act I for the whole of 
a rather different kind of drama. 
VI. PLURALISM 
Some of the most valuable points in Hot Air relate to problems of 
cultural and political pluralism: 
If the United States is viewed as a collection of ethnic groups, none of 
which has any natural right to intellectual, spiritual or political hegem-
ony, then what we need is not a spurious common culture or a fictional 
political ancestry but a genuine politics. The task of proceduralists is ... 
to find ways in which individuals might form communities that could 
coexist without resort to any form of imperialism. [p. 1206] 
One need buy neither Ken Jr.'s personal version of "Small is Beau-
tiful" nor his imperialist vision of the role of proceduralists in ac-
cepting that this kind of concern with pluralism presents sharp 
challenges to the Rationalist Tradition at a number of levels. 
Commentators have observed that Bentham's political theory had 
marked dirigiste and centralizing tendencies. His own personal polit-
ical views, even after his conversion to democracy, tended to favor 
unitary and centralized government. 55 However, he was well aware of 
the challenges presented by pluralism and he struggled with them in 
several of his writings.56 Nevertheless, it is fair to say that there is a 
55. In F. ROSEN, JEREMY BENTHAM AND REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY (1983), Rosen 
points out that while Bentham favored clear "chains of command" he was quite prepared to 
envisage federal structures and strong, varied local government: The picture of representative 
democracy that emerges from this survey of the main institutions and offices is one that high-
lights the radical and democratic character of the state. See, e.g., id. at 130-67. "Bentham's 
account of the citizen-army where the privates can dismiss the officers, his attempt to limit the 
power of the professional army to tum against the democratic constitution, his provisions for 
giving to the poor full access to all judicial services, his use of the quasi-jury to limit the use of 
power by judges, and the 'dislocative' power placed in the hands of the electorate to remove any 
administrative and judicial officer all testify to his determination to keep government fully ac-
countable to the people not only at periodic elections but also on numerous other occasions. Few 
modem democratic states provide for similar popular control." Rosen has recently also chal-
lenged the conventional view, promulgated by Halevy, that Bentham was simply an authoritarian 
in politics. Rosen, Elie Ha/ivy and Bentham's Authoritarian Liberalism, 6 ENLIGHTENMENT 
AND DISSENT 59 (1987). 
56. See Rosen, Bentham's Constitutional Theory and the Greek Constitution of 1822, 25 BAL-
KAN STUD. 38-43 (1984). 
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tension between Benthamite ideology and the kind of pluralism valued 
by Ken Jr. One, but by no means the only, point of conflict with 
evidentiary theory relates to background generalizations. According 
to one widely held view, every step in inferential reasoning about 
questions of fact requires justification by reference to one or more 
background generalizations. 57 These generalizations are highly prob-
lematic in a number of respects. They are typically left implicit and it 
is often difficult to articulate what precisely is the background general-
ization that is being relied on in a particular context. One only has to 
try to reconstruct one or two examples of actual arguments to see that 
few, if any, of such background generalizations are value-free.58 Fur-
thermore, this model of inductive reasoning postulates a relatively 
high degree of "cognitive consensus"; in a given society, questions of 
fact can be rationally resolved only by reference to the shared "stock 
of knowledge" in that society.59 In the absence of shared knowledge 
or values in respect of a given generalization, there is no basis for justi-
fying the inferential step. One must be careful not to exaggerate the 
extent of a lack of consensus about fact or value in a given context, but 
Ken Jr. and I seem to agree that the' Rationalist Tradition has tended 
to be unduly complacent in taking such a consensus for granted in 
regard to "common-sense generalizations."60 As he percipiently ob-
serves, "All of Bentham's models involve disputes arising from homo-
geneous groups" (p. 1214-15). One of the main values of Wigmore's 
approach to analysis of Evidence is that it forces those who adopt it in 
57. L. COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE (1977) [hereinafter L. COHEN]. See 
also supra note 16. 
58. See, e.g., THEORIES, supra note 2, at 142-51. 
59. See, e.g., L. CoHEN, supra note 57, at 274-75. 
60. See e.g., Some Scepticism, supra note 25, at 165; THEORIES, supra note 2, at 231-32, 
nn.17-20. 
Alex Stein comments: 
The problem of pluralism and unhomogeneous stocks of knowledge as one which sharply 
challenges the Rationalist Tradition, seems to me to be presented in a slightly far-reaching 
way .... Should one accept Ken Jr.'s vision of the society which consists of individuals and 
ethnic groups holding idiosyncratic, and by and large unshared, views and values? Even in 
nonmonolithic societies there should exist, can exist (and exists!) a sufficient stock of shared 
knowledge capable of sustaining a rationalist form of adjudication. If it is assumed that 
such a stock of knowledge does not exist, none of the procedural arrangements might be 
helpful, ie., the "task" which Ken Jr. imposes on proceduralists will be unperfonnable ab 
initio. I think, however, that Ken Jr. is right in his criticism of Bentham's absolutely non-
pluralistic paradigm of dispute resolution. Moreover, Bentham's "domestic tribunal" which 
professes a Natural System of litigation tends to underestimate the existence of common 
"family interests" of the parties in dispute. The latter interests are generally accepted in the 
milieu of domestic litigation as ones of a higher order than the merely private interests 
advocated by the parties. Hence, the allocation of factual mistakes committed by the family 
judge, the objectively acceptable rectitude of his decisions and their logical legalism are 
relatively uncrucial. In the society at large the common interests of a higher order are either 
nonexistent or too remote from the parties in dispute. It seems to me that due to the last 
reason (and partly due to the problem of nonhomogeneous stocks of knowledge and general-
izations) the Natural Model can not serve the procedural needs of a complex society. 
Author's personal communication with Alex Stein. 
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constructing or reconstructing arguments to articulate the precise 
background generalizations that are being invoked and hence to sub-
ject the arguments to critical scrutiny. One of the approach's main 
uses is to clarify what exactly is being argued. 61 
VII. WIGMORE'S LEGACY 
And so to Wigmore. Ken Jr. states that the central thesis of my 
chapter on Wigmore is "that Wigmore's The Science of Judicial Proof 
is an unjustly neglected theoretical work of great power" (p. 1215). 
This is not quite correct. Well aware that it would be an uphill task to 
persuade others to take this strange phenomenon seriously, I may have 
overplayed my hand. My argument is that the work deserves atten-
tion because: (a) it contains the most accessible and clear account of 
Wigmore's general ideas and underlying assumptions; (b) it embodies 
a bold and worthwhile attempt to develop a coherent, systematic, and 
broad interdisciplinary conception of Evidence and Proof as a subject 
within the discipline of law (whatever its flaws, Wigmore's "science" 
powerfully challenges the "Evidence-is-Rules" fallacy); and (c) certain 
sections (notably those concerned with the logic of proof, a small por-
tion of the whole) deserve to be rescued and developed. 
I also poke gentle fun at some of the eccentricities of what is in 
many respects a bizarre period piece: I suggest that the "colonel" is 
ripe for debunking and I try to relate the odd story of the choice of 
literary form and the publishing history of the book to the conserva-
tism and myopia of most Evidence teachers in the common law 
world. 62 Here Ken Jr. and I probably have some real disagreements. 
I learned much from his account of Wigmore's politics; I do not ex-
pect to convert him to the pedagogical and other values of Wigmorean 
analysis;63 but I find his clinging to a narrow and impoverished view 
of his subject incomprehensible and difficult to square with his other 
61. On articulation, see THEORIES, supra note 2, at 185-86. Ken Jr. accuses Bentham, Wig-
more and myself of being concerned to conceal hidden premises. In fact "holism" emphasizes 
the limits of our capacity to articulate, whereas one of the main claims for "the chart method" is 
that it is a procedure for spelling out each step in an argument and so can be used to try to 
articulate and subject to critical scrutiny assumptions that are typically left unstated in ordinary 
discourse. The "Pandora's box" passage, THEORIES, supra note 2, at 149, which Ken Jr. criti-
cized (pp. 1219-20), is quoted out of context, reconstructs Wigmore's views rather than mine, 
and relates to the practical constraints on raising metaphysical doubts and on making laboriously 
elaborate argument in court. 
62. See THEORIES, supra note 2, 109-13, 164-66. 
63. Ken Jr. is correct in hinting that I am not a practicing advocate. P. 1218. The bases for 
my claim that Wigmore's method formalizes (or "rationally reconstructs") some aspects of what 
many trial lawyers do in practice are: (a) the opinion of my collaborator, Professor Terry Ander-
son, and several other experienced clinicians, attorneys, and judges; (b) perusal of trial records, 
trial books, and secondary accounts of trials; and (c) the reactions to Wigmorean analysis of 
postgraduate students with trial experience. 
Skepticism about the value of Wigmore's Chart Method is widespread and unsurprising; the 
least skeptical are those who have had firsthand experience using it. For an experienced litigator, 
Ken Jr. is surprisingly neglectful of the differences between preparation for trial and presentation 
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protestations. Scratch Ken Jr. and one finds another orthodox teacher 
of Evidence who, at least in Hot Air, is court-centered, obsessed with 
contested jury trials, and conceives of his subject as being mainly 
based on the law reports. 64 The main reason for taking Wigmore's 
Science seriously is that he tried to broaden the subject of Evidence in 
a way that put Evidence doctrine in its proper place as one relatively 
small, but important, part of an undeveloped field and opened the way 
to drawing on a much richer range of materials for its study. In this 
respect, my enterprise draws heavily on Wigmore in a fashion that has 
almost nothing to do with "the instrumental ideology of Evidence" or 
obsession with social control. Furthermore, as should become appar-
ent in the next section, modified Wigmorean analysis, as some of us 
have tried to develop it, is rather closer to Art than to Science than it 
may seem on the surface. 
VIII. INFERENTIAL STREAMS, CASCADED INFERENCES, AND 
LA WYERS' STORIES 
He thought his happiness was complete when, as he meandered aimlessly 
along, suddenly he stood by the edge of a full-fed river. Never in his life 
had he seen a river before - this sleek, sinuous, full-bodied animal, 
chasing and chuckling, gripping things with a gurgle and leaving them 
with a laugh, to fling itself on fresh playmates that shook themselves 
free, and were caught and held again. All was a-shake and a-shiver -
glints and gleams and sparkles, rustle and swirl, chatter and bubble. The 
Mole was bewitched, entranced, fascinated. By the side of the river he 
trotted as one trots, when very small, by the side of a man who holds one 
spell-bound by exciting stories; and when tired at last, he sat on the 
bank, while the river still chattered on to him, a babbling procession of 
the best stories in the world, sent from the heart of the earth to be told at 
last to the insatiable sea. 6s 
Ken Jr., in a passage almost as lyrical as that of Ken Sr., contrasts 
the military orderliness of Wigmore Charts with the more fluid im-
agery of Albert Moore, who substitutes the concept of "inferential 
streams" for "lines" or "chains" of inferences: 
This fluid imagery allows us to see evidence as a protean body of water 
that ranges from an inert mass that goes nowhere but encompasses by its 
immensity to a clear sparkling mountain stream, a trickle of biting frigid-
ity that follows the path of least resistance ... yet is capable of making 
an indelible impression on even the hardest rock. 66 
I like the imagery and will borrow it in the future. But the under-
at trial. It is generally acknowledged that Wigmore's method is mainly useful for preparation 
rather than presentation. 
64. See, e.g., p. 1208; cf. text at notes 61-62 supra (the Evidence-is-Rules fallacy). 
65. WIND, supra note 1, at 4. 
66. P. 1223; see also Albert J. Moore's valuable essay, Inferential Streams: The Articulation 
and Illustration of the Trial Advocate's Evidentiary Intuitions, 34 UCLA L. REV. 611 (1987). 
May 1988] Hot Air in the Redwoods 1543 
lying idea is not new and it is very strange to suggest that in dealing 
with problems of reconstructing "reality" one has to make all-or-
nothing choices between stories and arguments, between synthesis and 
analysis, or between wet and dry metaphors. "And-Not," said my 
American Guru, "is bad Jurisprudence."67 Ken Jr. is plainly mistaken 
when he asserts that the idea that reality is constructed and is altered 
by our attempts to preserve it is "a thought frightful to ponder for 
theorists of 'proof' " (p. 1225). For example, Bentham's theory of fic-
tions, which underlies his theory of evidence, is an early example of a 
constructionist epistemology.68 Wigmore, rather naively, treated the 
Chart Method as an alternative, rather than a complement, to the 
Narrative method.69 Peter Tillers70 and Mohamed Abu Hareira71 
(who first sensitized me to this issue) have both wrestled with the 
problem of the relationship between "atomistic" and "holistic" ap-
proaches. So has David Schum, who significantly talks of "cascaded 
inferences."72 Even Bennett and Feldman, who perhaps go further 
than most in arguing for the primacy of the story in Reconstructing 
Reality in the Courtroom, allow some scope for logical analysis in pro-
viding tests of coherence, consistency, and plausibility.73 
Theorists of proof have been actively pondering the implications of 
constructionist ideas for years. But Ken Jr. is quite right in pointing 
to a tension between such ideas and at least cruder versions of techno-
cratic instrumentalism associated with the Rationalist Tradition (p. 
1225). Whether one characterizes such tensions in terms of atomism 
and holism, stories and arguments, or metaphors such as streams and 
chains, is secondary. The issues are central to both normative and 
descriptive theories of decisionmaking. 74 
67. K. LLEWELLYN, LAW IN OUR SOCIETY: A HORSE-SENSE THEORY OF THE INSTITl'-
TION OF LAW (unpublished, 1950), quoted in w. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REAL-
IST MOVEMENT 516 (1973). 
68. See Postema, Facts, Fictions and Law: Bentham on the Foundations of Evidence, 69 
A.R.S.P. 37, 52-54 (1983). 
69. J. WIGMORE, THE SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF 821-22, 858-59 (3d ed. 1937). 
70. Tillers, Modern Theories of Relevancy in IA J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 37 (P. Tillers ed. 
J983); Tillers, Mapping Inferential Domains, 66 B.U. L. REV. 883 (1986). 
71. A.M. HAREIRA, A HOLISTIC APPROACH TO THE ANALYSIS AND EXAMINATION OF EV-
IDENCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRIALS (1984) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis available at 
the University of Warwick); Hareira, An Early Holistic Conception of Judicial Fact-Finding, 1986 
JURIDICAL REV. 79 (1986). 
72. See, e.g., Schum, On the Behavioral Richness of Cascaded Inference Models: Examples in 
Jurisprudence, in 2 COGNITIVE THEORY 149-73 (J. Castellan, D. Pisani & G. Potts eds. 1977). 
73. W. BENNETT & M. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE COURTROOM 
(1981). 
74. Ken Jr. seems to deny normative theory in respect of thinking and decisionmaking. P. 
1223. Similarly, his o:onception of litigation as "a kind of political theatre," glosses over differ-
ences of standpoint. P. 1232. This perspective may be illuminating and entertaining for the 
outside observer, and useful - possibly even fun - for the professional actor. But Ken Jr.'s 
critique of the Progressive Paradigm is surely concerned with institutional design and improve-
ment. To suggest that litigation should be made even more like political theatre than it already is 
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During the past year Mole has made some preliminary explora-
tions into Narratology. Apart from finding it seductive, his most strik-
ing discovery is that Narratologists are no less imperialistic than 
enthusiastic Bayesians. His provisional, rather tame, conclusion is 
that Evidence discourse can benefit from diplomatic relations with 
both groups, but that it should resist all moves to make it part of 
either's Empire. 75 More important, however, is the point that holism 
presents a direct challenge to the prevailing conception of rationality 
espoused by the Rationalist Tradition. That does not involve giving 
up on the concept of Reason, but rather reinterpreting it. 
IX. lRRATIONALISM AND lRREALISM AS MISCHIEVOUS NONSENSE 
I have sometimes wondered what an Irrationalist Theory of Evi-
dence would look like. Ken Jr. has obliged and, in due course, it will 
call for comment. Revealingly, however, he retreats from calling it 
Irrationalist and merely claims that it is Irrealist, whatever that 
means. 76 This is sensible. Full-blooded irrationalism tends to be as 
self-defeating as other forms of skepticism. For the politically com-
mitted it is almost suicidal, for it disqualifies them from engaging in 
political arguments. 
This is not the place to attempt a full-scale defense of a concern for 
Reason and Rationality. Let it suffice here to give one political reason 
for wishing to preserve the concepts of Truth, Reason, and Justice as 
core concepts of Evidence discourse. I, for one, wish to have a lan-
guage for appraising and criticising adjudicative decisions. If one 
gives up the idea of the search for Truth as an aspiration, one also 
surrenders any claim to be able to talk of "mistakes" or "errors" or 
"miscarriages of justice" or "wrongful convictions." In an irrational-
ist world there are no innocent and no guilty parties, no reliable or 
unreliable evidence, no valid or invalid, strong or weak arguments. Of 
course, Ken Jr. does not believe that, and he and I probably have 
broadly similar views about what counts as a miscarriage of justice. 
But he is in danger of being seduced by his own rhetoric. For in-
stance, this is what he says of the Sacco-Vanzetti case: "Seven decades 
after Wigmore clashed with Frankfurter over the question, it seems 
unlikely that we will ever know for certain whether or not Sacco and 
Vanzetti were guilty of what must surely be one of the most studied 
robberies in Western history" (p. 1211). True, it is likely that we will 
never "know for certain,'' but to stop there is jejune. Having studied 
- that the analogy should be embraced - suggests a rather obnoxious form of elitism: enter-
taining for the uninvolved spectator; fecund in power and money for the powerful; and Hell for 
ordinary litigants, witnesses, and other legal worms. 
75. I shall develop these theories in two forthcoming papers: Lawyers' Stories and Anatomy 
of a Cause Ce/ebre. 
76. Pp. 1231-34 (''A Manifesto of Legal Irrea/ist Disbelief"). 
May 1988) Hot Air in the Redwoods 1545 
the case with some care (though stopping short of a full-scale analy-
sis), I wish to make some further reasonably confident judgments.11 
First, the evidence suggests that as a matter of historical fact it is more 
probable than not that it was not Sacco and Vanzetti who committed 
the murder of which they were convicted. The evidence against Sacco 
is somewhat stronger than that against Vanzetti. Second, Sacco and 
Vanzetti were victims of a miscarriage of justice, in that the case 
presented against them in court fell significantly below the criminal 
standard of proof. An ex post facto evaluation of the evidence suggests 
that there was considerable room for doubt about their involvement in 
the murder. Third, independent of the other two judgments, I believe 
that there are good grounds for claiming that the pretrial procedure, at 
first instance and subsequently, fell seriously short of civilized stan-
dards of due process. Thus a strong case can made for the judgment 
that Sacco and Vanzetti were the victims of a "miscarriage of justice" 
in three senses of that term: as a matter of historical fact as to the 
identity of the actual killers; in terms of the criminal standard of 
proof; and in respect of fair procedures. Sacco and Vanzetti have been 
made into potent political and literary symbols open to a rich variety 
of interpretations. But these interpretations are intimately related to 
one's beliefs about the other issues. My interpretation of the political 
legend would be quite different if I believed that one or both was a 
murderer or that the Massachusetts legal and political system had op-
erated with both decency and fairness. I, for one, wish to participate 
in discourse about such matters and, where appropriate, to come to 
considered conclusions and make judgments that I am prepared to jus-
tify. Throw out the concepts of Truth, Reason, and Justice in this 
context and one is condemned to silence or to making meaningless 
noises. 
Ken Jr.'s main fear seems to be that by promulgating a relatively 
clear model of what he calls "an instrumental ideology of Evidence," I 
am giving ammunition to Thatcherites, proto-Stalinists, and other sup-
porters of hierarchical statist social control (pp. 1207, 1214, 1230-31). 
I hope that enough has been said both here and elsewhere to establish 
that I am not an adherent of the Benthamite version of the Rationalist 
Tradition and that my political sympathies are very different from 
those who might use or abuse such an ideology in attempting to legiti-
mate repressive measures of social control. 
The main lesson that I have learned from this exchange with the 
author of Hot Air is that in the future I should spell out more clearly 
my conception of my scholarly enterprise and dissociate myself more 
77. These conclusions are based on my own, and several students', attempts to use the Trial 
Record and several secondary sources as the basis for exercises in Wigmorean analysis on a 
number of occasions. To date, my only other discussion of the case in print is in KARL LLEWEL-
LYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT supra note 67, at 341-49. 
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explicitly from the kind of crude instrumentalism that he attributes to 
me. I remain mystified by some key aspects of Ken Jr.'s version of 
West Coast Irrationalism and how he reconciles his commitment to 
due process with a view of litigation as political theatre. Maybe some 
field work is called for. California Here I Come! 
X. ENVOI 
I have tried to show that there are almost as many affinities be-
tween Theories, Hot Air, and Wind as people other than jurists might 
expect. If literary critics or contextual intellectual historians were ever 
to study and compare these works, they would have plenty of scope 
for differing interpretations. One hopes that these will not be confined 
to Freudian speculations about the relationship between Ken Sr. and 
Ken Jr. (a kind of DaDaism?). On two points the evidence seems to 
preclude serious disagreement. First, Ken Jr. clearly confused Toad 
and Mole. The alleged object of his attack has a taste for stories, riv-
ers, and exploring (rather timidly) in the Wild Wood; both by temper-
ament and commitment he prefers Art to Science and, above all, he 
has never so much as said "Poop-Poop" to Bayes' Theorem or any 
other mechanical device. 78 Mole burrows away on his own and counts 
as a gentle subversive because he reveals roots and foundations with all 
their faults, rather than destroying them by direct attack. 79 Second, 
Ken Jr. Qike, one suspects, Ken Sr.) seems curiously like Mr. Badger: 
He lives underground in the Wild Wood; he has secret access to Toad 
Hall; he is gruff and pretends to hate society, but is really gentle and 
good underneath; and, despite his protestations, he is an ally of Rat 
and Mole in the enterprise of saving Toad from himself. Badger also 
needs friends and allies to save him from self-destruction when he 
overheats and also to save him from spoiling good cases by poor advo-
cacy. There is, however, one puzzle. What is the likely political effect 
of Badger's growlings? The ending of Wind provides a possible clue: 
Sometimes, in the course of long summer evenings, the friends would 
take a stroll together in the Wild Wood, now successfully tamed so far as 
they were concerned; and it was pleasing to see how respectfully they 
were greeted by the inhabitants, and how the mother-weasels would 
bring their young ones to the mouths of their holes, and say, pointing, 
78. WIND, supra note 1, at 40-41. Toad fell in love with Bayes' Theorem at first sight: 
He breathed short, his face wore a placid, satisfied expression, and at intervals he faintly 
murmured "Poop-poop!" 
..• At intervals he was still heard to murmur "Poop-poop!" 
..• "The poetry of motion! The real way to travel! The only way to travel! Here to·day 
- in next week to·morrow! Villages skipped, towns and cities jumped - always somebody 
else's horizon! 0 bliss! 0 poop-poop! 0 my! 0 my!" 
79. Mole deplores the hijacking of his name by the writers of spy stories. Moles are not 
agents or double·agents for anyone. The world of spy faction and fiction is much closer to irreal-
ism than his more prosaic vision of litigation. 
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"Look, baby! There goes the great Mr. Toad! And that's the gallant 
Water Rat, a terrible fighter, walking along o' him! And yonder comes 
the famous Mr. Mole, of whom you so often have heard your father tell!" 
But when their infants were fractious and quite beyond control, they 
would quiet them by telling how, if they didn't hush them and not fret 
them, the terrible grey Badger would up and get them. This was a base 
libel on Badger, who, though he cared little about Society, was rather 
fond of children; but it never failed to have its full effect. so 
80. WIND, supra note 1, at 301-02. 

